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ABSTRACT
Attribute based encryption (ABE) is an encrypted access con-
trol mechanism that ensures efficient data sharing among dy-
namic group of users. Nevertheless, this encryption technique
presents two main drawbacks, namely high decryption cost
and publicly shared access policies, thus leading to possible
users’ privacy leakage.
In this paper, we introduce PHOABE, a Policy-Hidden
Outsourced ABE scheme. Our construction presents sev-
eral advantages. First, it is a multi-attribute authority ABE
scheme. Second, the expensive computations for the ABE
decryption process is partially delegated to a Semi Trusted
Cloud Server. Third, users’ privacy is protected thanks to
a hidden access policy. Fourth, PHOABE is proven to be
selectively secure, verifiable and policy privacy preserving
under the random oracle model. Five, estimation of the pro-
cessing overhead proves its feasibility in IoT constrained
environments.
Index Terms— Attribute based encryption, Hidden pol-
icy, Decryption outsourcing, Cloud computing, Privacy, Data
security
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to connecting different
kinds of devices (things), mainly sensors, RFID tags, PDAs
or smartphones to build a network. The deployment of these
IoT devices is gaining an expanding interest in the academic
research and industrial areas as well as in daily life [1] such
as smart grid [2], e-health [3], smart city, etc.
Currently, applications based on IoT can be found every-
where. According to Yao et al. [4], IoT is classified into Unit
IoT and Ubiquitous IoT categories according to the number
of the involved applications or domains [5]. The unit IoT cat-
egory is involved in a single application, where only one au-
thority is required. However, in the ubiquitous IoT category,
IoT is used in cross domain applications, where local, national
and industrial IoTs are interacting, thus requiring multiple au-
thorities across domain applications. Both unit IoT and Ubiq-
uitous IoT are becoming popular, and there is a strong need
for both of them to handle data processing and sharing among
different IoT devices.
The significant growth of involved IoT devices imposes
high requirements for data security and privacy preservation.
Hence, security problems have become a hurdle in fulfilling
the vision for IoT [6, 7].
In IoT applications, data are always transmitted, stored
and dynamically shared through the heterogeneous and dis-
tributed networks [8]. Consequently, encryption and access
control mechanisms are important in order to prevent unau-
thorized entities from accessing data [9–13].
Attribute based encryption schemes is a promising crypto-
graphic primitive that ensures efficient encrypted access con-
trol to outsourced data. Indeed, recently, several attribute
based encryption mechanisms have been proposed in litera-
ture [14–20].
Most of the proposed attribute based schemes have fo-
cused on designing expressive access control policies and pro-
viding low communication overheads, through short or con-
stant size ciphertexts [21–23]. Though these solutions present
low storage and communication costs, they are still not suit-
able to be used on resource-constrained devices such as mo-
bile devices and sensors. For instance, the construction of
ABE schemes is based on the use of bilinear maps which
present expensive computation costs. Moreover, the number
of these expensive bilinear operations increases along with the
number of attributes involved in the access structure, mainly
in the decryption procedure [24]. Hence, the most relevant
challenge is to reduce the decryption processing cost of the
introduced ABE mechanism while providing fine-grained ac-
cess control for users [25].
Green et al. [24] proposed, in 2011, the first attribute-
based encryption scheme with outsourced decryption. This
scheme consists in securely offloading the decryption process
of ABE to an external cloud based provider. This solution
ensures that most of the decryption cost can be released from
the IoT devices to the cloud.
In most attribute based encryption schemes, the access
structure is shared publicly with the related ciphertext. Hence,
any user who get the ciphertext can see its content. This ex-
posure of data’s access structure will disclose sensitive infor-
mation about the decryption or encryption party. Meanwhile,
in order to avoid disclosing these sensitive information, the
access structure should be hidden [26–28].
In addition, in single-authority ABE schemes, a central
attribute authority is responsible for managing and issuing all
users’ attributes and related secret keys. Although this set-
ting facilitates the key management, it can be a bottleneck
since central attribute authority is able to achieve a key es-
crow attack, due to its knowledge of the users’ private keys.
To solve this problem, many multi-attribute authority ABE
schemes have been proposed. These solutions rely on mul-
tiple parties to distribute attributes and private keys to users.
Such approach offers the scalability for the system even if the
number of users becomes important [21, 29, 30].
In this paper, we introduce a novel Policy-Hidden Out-
sourced Attribute Based Encryption (PHOABE) scheme. Our
proposed mechanism is multifold.
First, we extend the original multi-authority CP-ABE
scheme proposed by Lewko et al. [29] to support the out-
sourced decryption in order to better fit processing and com-
munication requirements of resource-constrained devices.
For instance, our scheme consists in delegating the expensive
computations during the decryption phase, to a Semi Trusted
Cloud Server, referred to as STCS.
Second, we apply policy-hidden techniques to ensure
users’ privacy and access policy confidentiality preservation.
Third, we introduce a secure mechanism consisting in ver-
ifying that the partially decrypted ciphertext was correctly
generated by the remote cloud server referred to as the ver-
ifiability concept.
Fourth, we show that our proposed mechanism is selec-
tively secure, verifiable and policy privacy preserving under
the random oracle model.
Paper Organisation – The remainder of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. First, Section 2 highlights security con-
siderations and design goals. Then, Section 3 reviews related
work and introduces attribute based mechanisms. In Sec-
tion 4, we describe the system model and the threat model
of the system. Afterwards, we detail the framework design
and we introduce the construction of our proposed scheme
in Section 5. In Section 6, we perform security analysis of
PHOABE based on security games. Finally, a theoretical per-
formance analysis is provided in Section 7, before concluding
in Section 8.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
As e-health systems are witnessing increased popularity, sev-
eral health organisations are using these systems in order to
centralize and share medical data in an efficient way.
Let us consider the following example, where a medi-
cal organisation relies on cloud based services to collect and
share Electronic Health Records (EHRs) among the medical
staff. Note that the medical staff can belong to different or-
ganisations such as hospitals, research laboratories, pharma-
cies, health ministry as well as doctors. The use of a cloud
architecture enables the hospital employees to access the data
using their smart devices (such as PDAs, smartphones · · · ),
considered as resource-constrained devices.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [31] states that access policies must finely precise
different access privileges of authorized users to the shared
outsourced data. In fact, a health-care information system
based on cloud services is required to protect medical records
from unauthorized access. Hence, the system must restrict
access of protected data to eligible doctors. For instance,
hospital employees, mainly doctors, have to share patients’
health information, in order to collaborate with the involved
hospital employees to properly prescript treatments. Thus,
they usually form dynamic sharing groups with different
granted privileges.
As data are always shared through the heterogeneous
and distributed networks, the proposed security mechanisms
should provide lightweight processing at the client side, while
supporting flexible sharing of encrypted outsourced data
among dynamic group of users.
To support all these features with efficiency, we propose
to design a multi-attribute authority ABE scheme with out-
sourced decryption to be run at the client side.
Thus, the proposed scheme PHOABE must fulfill the fol-
lowing properties:
• low computation overhead – PHOABE must introduce
cryptographic algorithms with low processing complex-
ity especially at the client side in order to ensure access
by different resource-constrained devices.
• data confidentiality – PHOABE has to protect the secrecy
of outsourced and encrypted data contents against both
curious cloud service providers and malicious users.
• flexible access control – our proposal should ensure fine
grained access control to allow authorized users to access
data.
• privacy – PHOABE must protect group members’ access
patterns privacy, while requesting access to outsourced
data.
3. ABE-RELATED WORK
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) was first designed by Sa-
hai and Waters to ensure encrypted access control [32]. In
ABE schemes, the ciphertext is encrypted for many users in-
stead of encrypting to a single user as in traditional public key
cryptography. In attribute based encryption schemes, user’s
private keys and ciphertext are associated with an access pol-
icy or a set of attributes [33]. Thus, a data user is able to de-
crypt the ciphertext if his private key matches the ciphertext.
ABE schemes are classified into two categories, namely: Key-
Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [34].
In KP-ABE, the ciphertext are labeled with a set of at-
tributes while the users’ private keys are associated with an
access policy which can be any monotonic tree. The user is
able to decrypt the ciphertext if its access policy is satisfied
by the attributes embedded in the ciphertext. Although the
KP-ABE scheme offers fine-grained access control feature, it
has one main disadvantage. Indeed, the data owners cannot
decide on who has access to their encrypted data, except by
their choice of descriptive attributes for the data, as the access
policy is embedded in the user’s private keys. Consequently,
the data owners have to trust the key issuer. Ciphertext-policy
ABE schemes remove such inconvenience by directly embed-
ding the access policy on the ciphertext. As such, the data
owners can now authorize who can have access on their en-
crypted data [21, 29, 34].
CP-ABE schemes allow the data owner to precise the
users authorized to access the data, by embedding the ac-
cess policy to the ciphertext [21], [35], [26] [36]. In order
to issue private keys related to the user’s set of attributes,
ABE schemes rely on trusted authorities. ABE schemes can
be categorized into two types namely single-authority ABE
schemes and multi-authority ABE schemes.
In a single-authority ABE scheme, the attributes and their
related private keys are issued by a central attribute author-
ity. Although this centralized approach makes the key man-
agement easier, it does not ensure scalability especially when
involving a huge number of users. To address this problem,
multi-attribute authority ABE schemes [29, 30, 37] have been
proposed.
In 2011, Lewko and Waters [29] proposed a multi-
attribute authority scheme consisting on issuing attributes
and their related secret keys from different attribute author-
ities. For instance, an attribute authority is responsible for
generating a private key associated to a user’s attribute. Con-
sequently, this scheme does not rely on a central trusted
authority to manage attributes’ secret keys. In addition,
Lewko and Waters use a Unique Global Identifier (GID) for
each user to prevent collision attacks. Hence, a user must
send his unique GID to each attribute authority to receive his
attribute’s secret key. Although CP-ABE ensures fine grained
and flexible access control, it requires an expensive decryp-
tion costs which be not convenient for resource-constrained
devices.
For instance, these expensive computation costs are
mainly related to the execution of several pairing functions.
In addition, the decryption process requires the execution
of a number of pairing operations which increases with the
number of attributes involved in the access policy [24]. Ad-
ditionally, the use of CP-ABE schemes consists in sharing
the access structure associated with the ciphertext with the
involved authorities which can disclose the attributes in the
access policy.
In the following, we present a review of the proposed out-
sourcing attribute based encryption mechanisms in Section
3.1. Then, we introduce policy hidden attribute based encryp-
tion schemes in Section 3.2.
3.1. Outsourcing Attribute Based Encryption
As detailed in the aforementioned section, ABE schemes
present expensive decryption costs which increase along with
the number of attributes of involved attributes in the access
policy. In fact, thanks to their bilinearity properties, ABE
schemes usually rely on expensive-computing pairing-based
operations. Obviously, this limit is mainly prominent for
resource-constrained devices.
To reduce expensive costs, several research works rely on the
use of constant attribute based encryption schemes generating
ciphertext size and relying on a constant number of bilinear
operations [23,36,38–41]. However, these schemes consist in
using threshold or conjunctive access policies which do not
provide the desired expressiveness.
To mitigate this drawback, in 2011, Green et al. [24] pro-
posed a new approach consisting in outsourcing the expen-
sive operations during the decryption phase to a third party.
This approach consists in generating a transformation key de-
rived from the user’s secret key. Then, the user shares this
generated transformation key with a semi-trusted cloud server
(STCS).
The ciphertext is then submitted to the STCS which uses the
transformation key to generate a partially decrypted cipher-
text of the same message and sends it to the user. Afterwards,
the user can recover the original message using the short ci-
phertext and his secret key with only one exponentiation op-
eration. Note that the semi-trusted cloud server cannot gain
any information about the encrypted message while partially
decrypting the ciphertext. In addition, this process helps the
user to save the local computation costs.
This new concept proposed by Green et al. [24] is sim-
ilar to the concept of proxy re-encryption [42–44] where an
untrusted proxy is given a re-encryption key that allows it to
transform an encryption under Alice’s key of m into an en-
cryption under Bob’s key of the same m, without allowing the
proxy to learn anything about m.
While using attribute based encryption schemes with out-
sourced decryption, the user relies on the use of a semi-trusted
third party to partially decrypt the ciphertext. Thus, to en-
sure data security, the user should be able to verify that the
received partially decrypted ciphertext is not altered. For in-
stance, a lazy STCS can return a ciphertext which has been
previously computed for the user or a malicious STCS can
generate a forged transformation of the ciphertext [45].
Some research works introduced verifiable computation
techniques which can be used to construct attribute based en-
cryption schemes with verifiable outsourced decryption [46–
48]. The solutions proposed in [46, 48] apply a fully homo-
morphic encryption chemes [49] which require a huge com-
putation costs.
In 2013, Lai et al. [50] proposed a security model to ver-
ify the correctness of a ciphertext generated by an outsourced
attribute based encryption scheme. Although the authors in-
troduced a verifiable outsourced attribute based encryption
scheme, this latter presents an expensive computation cost at
the encrypting entity side which is not suitable for resource-
constrained devices. For instance, in the proposed scheme,
the ciphertext is composed by the encrypted message and an
encrypted random message. Thus, to ensure the verification
of the correctness of the partially decrypted ciphertext, the
encrypting entity adds a redundant encrypted message in the
ciphertext.
Li et al. proposed, in 2014, an attribute based encryp-
tion scheme with outsourced decryption while ensuring the
ciphertext verifiability [51], based on their first construction
presented in [52]. Their proposal requires the deployment
of two cloud service providers to perform the outsourced
key-issuing and decryption algorithms. However, proposed
scheme relies on a single-authority ABE scheme authority.
Thus, all the attribute involved in the system are issued and
managed using a central attribute authority.
Afterwards, Wang et al. [53] introduced, in 2015, a server
aided CP-ABE system. In fact, users can rely on a proxy-
server to pre-compute a partially encrypted ciphertext per-
mitting to improve the efficiency of the encryption process.
Then, the encrypting entity uses the partially encrypted ci-
phertext to generate the encryption of the message and share
it. In the decryption phase, users rely on a computing server
to perform expensive operations introduced by the decryption
process. Although this proposal presents a significant reduc-
tion of computation costs, it relies on the use of a single do-
main architecture which is inconvenient for distributed IoT
systems.
Qin et al. [45] extend an attribute based encryption
scheme with the verifiable outsourcing feature. Although
this proposal presents low computation cost, it relies single-
authority ABE scheme. Hence, this can be a bottleneck as
this authority may achieve a key escrow attack, due to its
knowledge of all users’ private keys.
In 2015, Lin et al. [54] propose a verifiable oustourced
attribute based encryotion scheme. In this proposal, the veri-
fication process relies on the use of an attribute based key en-
capsulation mechanism, a symmetric-key encryption scheme
and a commitment scheme. Their construction is based on
the ABE scheme proposed by Waters in 2011 [35] which is a
single attribute authority ABE scheme.
Zuo et al. [25] present a CCA-secure ABE scheme with
outsourced decryption for fog computing applications. This
scheme does not introduce a mechanism to verify the correct-
ness of the partially decrypted ciphertext, generated from the
outsourcing decryption algorithm.
Recently, in 2017, Li et al. [55] proposed an attribute
based encryption scheme with the verifiable outsourced de-
cryption feature. This single-authority construction provides
constant-size ciphertexts while relying on the use of mono-
tone access structures.
Above all, the aforementioned schemes rely on single-
authority attribute based encryption schemes. However, IoT
is used in cross domain applications, where local, national and
industrial IoTs are interacting. Consequently, multi-attribute
authority ABE schemes are more suitable in IoT context. This
motivates us to introduce a verifiable outsourced attribute
based encryption scheme with multi-attribute authority con-
struction.
3.2. Policy Hidden Attribute Based Encryption
To support flexible access data control, CP-ABE schemes
have been widely applied in distributed architectures. How-
ever, access policies are usually publicly shared with the
different involved entities, which may disclose sensitive in-
formation about both decrypting and encrypting entities.
To protect sensitive information included in access poli-
cies, several research works [36, 56] introduces CP-ABE
schemes with a partially hidden policies. In fact, an access
policy involves a set of attributes expressed as a couple: the
generic attribute name and the attribute value. Usually, the
attribute value contains more sensitive information. For in-
stance, the attribute values ”pediatrician” and ”XF12599”
are more sensitive than the attribute names ”Doctor” and
”Patient”, respectively. Therefore, CP-ABE schemes with
partially hidden policies consists in hiding the attribute value
to protect the sensitive information. That is, instead of a
full access structure, a partially hidden access structure (e.g.,
”(Patient: * AND Hospital: *) OR (Doctor: * AND Hospital:
*)”) which consists of only attribute names without attribute
values is attached to a ciphertext. Although ABE schemes
with partially hidden access structures ensure attributes’ val-
ues secrecy, they still suffer from a set of security issues,
mainly the off-line dictionary attacks.
In 2008, Nishide et al. [26] proposed an attribute based en-
cryption scheme with partially hidden access control policy.
This construction relies on the single authority ABE scheme
proposed by Cheung et al. [36]. As such, the [26] proposal
uses a central authority to issue attributes and secret keys to
different users.
In 2012, Lai et al. [56] proposed an attribute based en-
cryption scheme with partially hidden access policy. This
proposal is based on the Waters’ attribute based encryption
scheme [35]. Hence, it relies on the use of a single authority
architecture which is not convenient for distributed IoT archi-
tectures.
To address the security and privacy issues raised by CP-
ABE with partially hidden policy schemes, CP-ABE with hid-
den access policy schemes are introduced [27, 28, 57]. Al-
though these schemes ensure the privacy of access policies,
they still suffer from high processing overhead. However, the
trade-off between efficiency and perfect privacy is the main
design challenge of several security mechanisms.
Xu et al. [28] extended the attribute based encryption
scheme proposed by Bethencourt et al. [33] with the hidden
access policy feature, for cloud applications. However, this
ABE scheme relies on the use of a central attribute authority
to manage all the attributes and private keys in the system.
Hence, this can be a bottleneck as a central attribute authority
is able to achieve a key escrow attack.
In 2015, Zhou et al. [57] proposed a privacy preserving
attribute based broadcast encryption scheme. This proposal
consists in encrypting a message using an expressive hidden
access policy. Then, the encrypted message can be broad-
casted with or without explicitly specifying the receivers.
However, the [57] construction introduces a high computa-
tion cost, such that the deciphering entity needs to perform
several pairing operations to decrypt the ciphertext.
Phuong et al. [27] proposed an attribute based encryption
scheme with hidden access policy. This construction uses
an access policy with only AND gates. Thus, this proposal
presents less expressiveness compared to other schemes.
Above all, the mentioned proposals rely on single-authority
attribute based encryption schemes. Recently, Zhong et
al. [58] proposed the first policy hidden attribute based en-
cryption scheme using multi-attribute authority architecture.
However, because of the required pairing operations, this
scheme introduces an expensive computation cost at the
client side to execute the decryption process.
In most of the existing policy-hidden CP-ABE schemes,
The decryption computation costs grow proportionally with
complexity of the access structures. This motivates us to
introduce a policy hidden multi-attribute authority CP-ABE
scheme with decryption outsourcing. To evaluate the objec-
tives given in Section 2, we introduce, in Table 1, a com-
parison of our scheme PHOABE with different CP-ABE
constructions, that are most closely-related to our context.
On one hand, several research works have introduced ABE
with outsourced decryption scheme [24,25,45,50,51,54,55],
PHOABE is the first multi-authority attribute based scheme
with outsourced decryption ensuring the ciphertext verifi-
ability. On the other hand, ABE with hidden policy has
been addressed [26–28, 57, 58] in several research works, but
PHOABE is he only scheme suitable for resource-constrained
devices.
3.3. Mathematical Background
In this section, we first introduce the access structure in Sec-
tion 3.3.1. Then, in Section 3.3.2, we present the bilinear
maps. Finally, we introduce some security assumptions.
3.3.1. Access Policies
Access policies can be represented by one of the following
formats: boolean functions of attributes or a Linear Secret
Sharing Scheme (LSSS) matrix [29].
Definition 1. Access Structure
Let {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆
2{P1,··· ,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C if B∈ A and B⊆C then C ∈ A.
An access structure is a collection A of non-empty subsets of
{P1, · · · ,Pn}, such as A⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn}\ /0.
We note that any access structure can be converted into a
boolean function. Boolean functions can be represented by
an access tree, where the leaves present the attributes while
the intermediate and the root nodes are the logical operators
AND (∧) and OR (∨).
Definition 2. Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS)
A Linear Secret Sharing Scheme LSSS [29] over a set of
parties P is defined as follows:
1. the shares of each party form a vector over Zp.
2. Let us consider an (n× l) matrix A called the share-
generating matrix for a Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
LSSS. The row i ∈ [1, · · · ,n] of A is is labeled by a
function ρ(i) : {1, · · · ,n} → P. Let s ∈ Zp be a secret
value to be shared, then we consider a column vector
~v = [s,r2, · · · ,rn] where r2, · · · ,rn ∈ Zp are random val-
ues. Consequently, A.~v=~λ is the vector of n shares of the
secret s according to LSSS.
3.3.2. Bilinear Maps
Let us consider two multiplicative cyclic groups G1 and GT
of prime order P and g a generater of G1. eˆ :G1×G1→GT
is a bilinear map if it fulfill the bilinearity, the non-degeneracy
and computability properties. These properties are defined as
follows:
1. bilinearity: ∀u,v ∈G1 and a,b ∈ Zp , we have eˆ(ua,vb) =
eˆ(u,v)ab.
2. non-degeneracy: eˆ(g,g) 6= 1.
3. computability: eˆ is efficiently computable. eˆ is computed
by an efficient algorithm for any g1,g2 ∈G0.
We say that G0 is a bilinear group if the group operation
Table 1. Features and Functionality Comparison of Attribute Based Encryption Schemes
Scheme Type Access Policy Hidden Policy Outsourced Decryption Verifiability Multi-authority Security Models
[26] CP-ABE LSSS Partially hidden 7 7 Single Selective CPA
[56] CP-ABE LSSS Partially hidden 7 7 Single Selective CPA
[24] CP-ABE LSSS 7 X 7 Single RCCA
[50] CP-ABE LSSS 7 X X Single Selective CPA
[51] CP-ABE LSSS 7 X X Single RCCA
[57] CP-ABE LSSS Fully Hidden 7 7 Single Selective CPA
[28] CP-ABE LSSS Fully Hidden 7 7 Single Selective CPA
[45] CP-ABE LSSS 7 X X Single RCCA
[54] CP-ABE LSSS 7 X X Single Selective CPA
[58] CP-ABE LSSS Fully Hidden 7 7 Multi Selective CPA
[27] CP-ABE AND gates Fully Hidden 7 7 Single Selective CPA
[25] CP-ABE LSSS 7 X 7 Single Selective CCA
[55] CP-ABE AND gates 7 X X Single RCCA
PHOABE CP-ABE LSSS Fully Hidden X X Multi Selective RCPA
Fig. 1. The PHOABE main architecture entities and their in-
teraction
in G0 and the bilinear map eˆ : G0×G0 → G1 are both
efficiently computable.
4. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Our proposed framework considers a cloud storage system
involving multiple attribute authorities as detailed in Figure
1. Hence, PHOABE involves five different entities: the Cloud
Service Provider (CSP), the Central Trusted Authority (CTA),
the Semi-Trusted Cloud Server (STCS), the Attribute Author-
ities (AA), the data owner (O) and data users (U).
In this section, we introduce our system model in Section
4.1. Then, we detail our security model in Section 4.2.
4.1. System Model
Our PHOABE scheme relies on seven randomized algorithms
defined as follows:
setup(λ) → PP – the setup algorithm is performed by
the central trusted authority (CTA) to output the global public
parameters PP. Thus, this randomized algorithm takes as
input λ which is a chosen security parameter.
setupauth(PP) → (skAA j , pkAA j) – an attribute author-
ity AA j( j ∈ N) executes this randomized algorithm, where
N is the number of attribute authorities in the system. The
setupauth takes as input PP and generates the pair of private
and public keys (skAA j , pkAA j).
encrypt(PP,{pkAA j},M,(A,ρ))→ CT – the encryption
algorithm is executed by the data owner (O) to generate the
ciphertext CT . It takes as input PP, the set of involved at-
tribute authorities’ public keys {pkAA j}, the data file M and
the access policy Ψ= (A,ρ).
keygen(PP,skAA j , pkAA j ,GID,S j,GID) → sk j,GID – this
algorithm is performed by an attribute authority AA j in order
to generate the user’s secret key related to a set of attributes
S j,GID = {a1 j , · · · ,an j}, where n j is the number of attributes
of S j,GID. It takes as input the global parameters PP, the pair
of private and public attribute authority’s keys (skAA j , pkAA j)
and the users’ identity GID. It outputs the secret key sk j,GID
related to the set of attributes S j,GID.
transform(PP,{sk j,GID} j∈N ,(A,ρ),CT )→{tk j,GID} j∈N
– this algorithm is performed by the user (U) having a set of
attributes SGID and their related secret keys {sk j,GID} j∈N
received from the different involved attribute authorities
{AA j} j∈N . It takes as input the global public parameters
PP, the user’s secret keys {sk j,GID} j∈N , the access policy
Ψ= (A,ρ) and the ciphertext CT . The transform algorithm
generates the set of the transformation keys {tk j,GID} j∈N =
({t pk j,GID} j∈N , tskGID) related to the user’s secret keys,
where {t pk j,GID} j∈N and tskGID are the public and private
transformation keys, respectively.
decryptout(PP,{t pk j,GID} j∈N ,(A,ρ),CT ) → M′ – the
semi-trusted cloud server (STCS) executes the decryptout
algorithm to retrieve the partially decrypted ciphertext M′.
This algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP, the
transformation key {t pk j,GID} j∈N , an access policy (A,ρ)
and the ciphertext CT .
decrypt(M′, tskGID)→M – the user U executes the de-
cryption algorithm to retrieve the message M. This algorithm
takes as input the transformation secret key tskGID and the
partially decrypted ciphertext M′ and outputs the message M.
4.2. Security Model
We consider two realistic threat models for proving security
and privacy properties of our PHOABE construction. We first
consider a honest but curious cloud provider. That is, the
cloud is honest as it provides proper inputs or outputs, at each
step of the protocol, properly performing any calculations ex-
pected from it, but it is curious in the sense that it attempts to
gain extra information from the protocol. As such, we con-
sider the honest but curious threat model against the access
policy privacy requirement, as presented in Section 4.2.3.
Then, we study the case of malicious users and servers, trying
to override their rights. That is, they may attempt to deviate
from the protocol or to provide invalid inputs. As such, we
consider the malicious user security model against the access
policy privacy requirement and the confidentiality property,
detailed in Section 4.2.1. Also, we consider the malicious
STCS security model against the verifiability requirement, as
introduced in Section 4.2.2. For instance, a lazy STCS can
return a ciphertext which has been previously computed for
the user or a malicious STCS can generate a forged transfor-
mation of the ciphertext.
4.2.1. Confidentiality
To design the most suitable security model considering the
confidentiality requirement, we adopt a relaxation introduced
by Canetti et al. [59] called Replayable CPA (RCPA) secu-
rity. Indeed, under the RCPA security model, the provided
ciphertext can be modified without changing the message in a
meaningful way.
In our security model, we assume that the adversary is al-
lowed to query for any secret keys that cannot be used for
decrypting the challenge ciphertext. In addition, we consider
the assumption introduced in the Lewko et al. proposal [29]
that states that the adversary can only corrupt authorities stat-
ically. Let consider SAA the set of all attribute authorities and
S′AA a set of corrupted attribute authorities.
Our PHOABE scheme is RCCA-Secure if there is no
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary that can win
the Expcon f security game defined below with non-negligible
advantage.
The Expcon f security game is formally defined, between
an adversary A and a challenger C as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A chooses a
challenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) and sends it to the
challenger C .
Setup – during this phase, the challenger C first runs the
setup algorithm to generate the public parameters.
Then, the adversary A selects a set of corrupted attribute
authorities S′AA ⊂ SAA and runs the setupauth algorithm to
obtain their public and private keys.
Subsequently, C queries the honest attribute authorities’
public and private keys by running the setupauth algorithm.
Afterwards, the challenger C publishes the public keys of the
honest attribute authorities.
Queries phase 1 – in this phase, the challenger first ini-
tializes an empty table T and an empty set D. Then, for each
session k, the adversary issues the following queries:
• Private Key query: the adversary queries the secret
keys {sk j,GID}SAA related to a set of attributes {SGID}k
belonging to a set of non-corrupted attribute authorities
ai ∈ SAA \S′AA. Then, the challenger sets D=D∪{SGID}k
returns the corresponding secret keys to the adversary.
Note that the set of attributes {SGID}k does not satisfy the
access policy Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) i.e; Ψ∗({SGID}k) 6= 1.
• Transformation Key query: the adversary queries the
secret keys {sk j,GID}SAA related to a set of attributes
{SGID}k belonging to a set of non-corrupted attribute
authorities ai ∈ SAA \ S′AA. Afterwards, the challenger
searches the entry (SGID,{sk j,GID}SAA ,{tk j,GID}SAA) in
table T . If such entry exists, it returns the set of the
transformation keys {tk j,GID}SAA . Otherwise, it gen-
erates h used to run the tranform . Then, the chal-
lenger runs keygen(PP,skAA j , pkAA j ,GID,SGID) and the
transform(PP,{sk j,GID} j∈N ,(A,ρ),CT ) algorithms and
stores in the table T the entry (SGID,{sk j,GID}SAA ,{tk j,GID}SAA).
Then, it returns to the adversary the set of the transforma-
tion keys {tk j,GID}SAA .
Challenge – during the challenge phase, the adversary
chooses two equal length plaintexts M0 and M1 and sends
them to the challenger. The challenger C chooses a random
bit b such that b ∈ {0,1} and encrypts CTb under the access
structure (A∗,ρ∗). The generated ciphertext CTb is then re-
turned to the adversary.
Queries phase 2 – in this phase, the adversary A who has
already received Mb, can query a polynomially bounded num-
ber of queries as in Queries Phase 1, except that the adver-
sary A can not query secret keys related to a set of attributes
which satisfy the access policy Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Guess – the adversary tries to guess which message Mb′
where b′ ∈ {0,1} corresponds to the challenge ciphertext CTb.
The advantage of the adversary to win the game is defined as:
AdvA [ExpCon f (1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |
Definition 3. Our PHOABE scheme is RCPA-Secure ABE
(i.e; secure against replayable chosen plaintext attacks)
against static corruption of the attribute authorities if the
advantage AdvA [ExpCon f (1ξ)] is negligible for all PPT ad-
versaries.
4.2.2. Verifiability
Our PHOABE scheme is said to be verifiable if there is no
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary that can win
the Expveri f security game defined below with non-negligible
advantage.
The Expveri f security game is formally defined, between
an adversary A and a challenger C as follows:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A chooses a
challenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) and sends it to the
challenger C .
Setup – during this phase, the challenger C runs the
setup algorithm to generate the public parameters.
Then, the adversary A selects a set of corrupted attribute
authorities S′AA ⊂ SAA and runs the setupauth algorithm to
obtain their public and private keys.
Subsequently, C queries the honest attribute authorities’
public and private keys by running the setupauth algorithm.
Afterwards, the challenger C publishes the public keys of the
honest attribute authorities.
Queries phase 1 – in this phase, the challenger first ini-
tializes an empty table T and an empty set D. Then, for each
session k, the adversary issues the following queries:
• Private Key query: the adversary queries the secret
keys {sk j,GID}SAA related to a set of attributes {SGID}k
belonging to a set of non-corrupted attribute authorities
SAA \S′AA. Then, the challenger sets D = D∪{SGID}k re-
turns the corresponding secret keys to the adversary. Note
that the set of attributes {SGID}k does not satisfy the ac-
cess policy Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) i.e; Ψ∗({SGID}k) 6= 1.
• Transformation Key query: the adversary queries
the secret keys {sk j,GID}SAA related to a set of attributes
{SGID}k belonging to a set of non-corrupted attribute au-
thorities ai ∈ SAA \ S′AA. Then, the challenger searches
the entry (SGID,{sk j,GID}SAA ,{tk j,GID}SAA) in table T .
If such entry exists, it returns the set of the transfor-
mation keys {tk j,GID}SAA . Otherwise, it generates h
used to run the transform algorithm. Then, the chal-
lenger runs keygen(PP,skAA j , pkAA j ,GID,SGID) and the
transform(PP,
{sk j,GID} j∈N ,(A,ρ),CT ) algorithms and stores in the ta-
ble T the entry (SGID,{sk j,GID}SAA ,{tk j,GID}SAA). Then,
it returns to the adversary the set of the transformation
keys {tk j,GID}SAA .
Challenge – during the challenge phase, the adversary
chooses a challenge message M∗ and sends it to the chal-
lenger. The challenger C encrypts M∗ and generates the veri-
fication key V ∗ under the access structure (A∗,ρ∗). Then, the
generated ciphertext CT ∗ is returned to the adversary.
Queries phase 2 – in this phase, the adversary A can
query a polynomially bounded number of queries as in
Queries Phase 1, except that the adversary A can not query
secret keys related to a set of attributes which satisfy the
access policy Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Forge – the adversary generates an attribute set {S∗GID}
and a partially decrypted ciphertext M′∗ by running the al-
gorithm decryptout(PP,{t pk∗j,GID} j∈N ,(A∗,ρ∗),CT ∗) . We
suppose that the tuple (S∗GID,{sk∗j,GID}SAA ,{tk∗j,GID}SAA) is in-
cluded in the table T . Otherwise, the challenger generates the
tuple as a response for transformation key query.
The adversaryA wins the game if decrypt(M′∗,{tk∗j,GID}SAA) /∈
{M∗,⊥} and the challenger can verify the generated partially
decrypted ciphertext using the verification key V ∗.
Hence, the adversary’s advantage is defined as follows:
AdvA [Expveri f (1ξ)] = |Pr[Expveri f (1ξ)] = 1|
Definition 4. Our PHOABE scheme is verifiable, if the ad-
vantage AdvA [ExpVeri f (1ξ)] is negligible for all PPT adver-
saries.
4.2.3. Access Policy Privacy Preservation
The notion of access policy privacy consists in hiding the ac-
cess structure used to encrypt a message from both the server
and the decrypting entity. Indeed, the server or any decrypting
entity should not be able to gain any knowledge of the policy
except that the user knows whether his attributes satisfy the
access policy.
Our PHOABE scheme ensures the access policy privacy
preservation requirement if there is no probabilistic polyno-
mial time (PPT) adversary that can win the ExpPriv security
game defined below with non-negligible advantage.
The ExpPriv security game is formally defined, between
an adversary A and a challenger C as follows:
Setup – in this phase, the challenger C first runs the
setup algorithm to generate the public parameters.
Then, the adversary A selects a set of corrupted attribute
authorities S′AA ⊂ SAA and runs the setupauth algorithm to
obtain their public and private keys.
Subsequently, C queries the honest attribute authorities’
public and private keys by running the setupauth algorithm.
Afterwards, the challenger C publishes the public keys of the
honest attribute authorities.
Queries phase 1 – in this phase, the challenger first ini-
tializes an empty table T and an empty set D. Then, for each
session k, the adversary issues the following queries:
• Private Key query: the adversary queries the secret keys
related to a set of attributes {SGID}k belonging to a set
of non-corrupted attribute authorities SAA \ S′AA. Then,
the challenger sets D = D∪ {SGID}k returns the corre-
sponding secret keys to the adversary. Note that the set
of attributes {SGID}k does not satisfy the access policy
Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) i.e; Ψ∗({SGID}k) 6= 1.
• Transformation Key query: the challenger searches
the entry (SGID,{sk j,GID}SAA ,{tk j,GID}SAA) in table T .
If such entry exists, it returns the set of the transfor-
mation keys {tk j,GID}SAA . Otherwise, it generates h
used to run the tranform . Then, the challenger runs
keygen(PP,skAA j , pkAA j ,
GID,SGID) and the transform(PP,{sk j,GID} j∈N ,(A,ρ),CT )
algorithms and stores in the table T the entry (SGID,{sk j,GID}SAA ,
{tk j,GID}SAA). Then, it returns to the adversary the set of
the transformation keys {tk j,GID}SAA .
Challenge – during the challenge phase, the adversary A
sends two challenge messages M∗1 and M
∗
2 and two valid ac-
cess policies Ψ1 and Ψ2 to the challenger under the following
restriction: Either all the adversaries satisfy none of the poli-
ciesΨ1 andΨ2 or they all satisfy both policies throughout the
game. For instance, to ensure that the adversary has not any
knowledge of the policy except that he knows whether his at-
tributes satisfy the access policy, the adversary should satisfy
either both policies or none of them.
Then, the challenger flips a fair coin b ∈ {1,2} and en-
crypts a message M∗b under the access policy Ψb according
to the sender’s encryption algorithm by running the encryp-
tion algorithm encrypt(PP,{pkAA j},M∗b ,Ψb) . The resulting
challenge ciphertext CT ∗ is then returned to the adversary.
Queries phase – in this phase, the adversary A can query
a polynomially bounded number of queries as in Queries
Phase 1, except that the adversary A satisfy none of the poli-
cies Ψ1 and Ψ2 or they all satisfy both policies throughout
the game and A may not ask the challenger C for decrypting
the challenge ciphertext CT ∗.
Guess – the adversary tries to guess which message M∗b′
where b′ ∈ {1,2} corresponds to the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗. The advantage of the adversary to win the game is
defined as:
AdvA [ExpPriv(1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |
Definition 5. Our PHOABE scheme ensures the access pol-
icy privacy preservation against Adaptive Chosen plaintext
Attack if the advantage AdvA [ExpPriv(1ξ)] = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |
is negligible for all PPT adversaries.
5. SECURELY OUTSOURCING POLICY HIDDEN
ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION
5.1. Overview
In this paper, we develop an outsourcing policy hidden multi-
authority attribute based encryption scheme as a novel secu-
rity mechanism for encrypted access control to outsourced
data in cloud storage environments. Our proposal is based
on the use of the multi-authority attribute based encryption
scheme proposed by Lewko et al. [29] in 2011 which has
been extended to provide security and functional features
such as low computation cost, privacy preservation, fine
grained access control and data confidentiality. For instance,
our scheme introduces a novel outsourcing attribute based
encryption which consists in reducing the decryption cost by
securely delegating the most expensive computations in the
decryption phase of CP-ABE to a semi-trusted party while
ensuring privacy preservation of the access policy. Figure 2
illustrates the general overview of the PHOABE algorithms.
The different notations used in this paper are listed in Ta-
ble 2.
Table 2. The different notations used in this paper
Notation Description
CSP Cloud Service Provider
CTA Central Trusted Authority
STCS Semi Trusted Cloud Server
AA Attribute Authority
O Data Owner
U User
PP Public Parameters
skAA j Secret key related to AA j
pkAA j Public key related to AA j
A LSSS access matrix
Ψ Access policy
DF Data file
GID User Global Identifier
S j,GID A set of attributes belonging to a user
GID received from AA j
sk j,GID the secret key related to the set of at-
tributes S j,GID, received from AA j
{tk j,GID} j∈N Transformation keys
({t pk j,GID} j∈N Transformation public key
tskGID Transformation secret key
M Data file
CT The encrypted data file
M’ Partially decrypted data file
5.2. Complexity Assumptions
In our outsourcing policy hidden multi-authority attribute
based encryption, we rely on the following complexity as-
sumptions:
Definition 6. Computational Diffie Hellman problem (CDH)
Given a generator g of a multiplicative cyclic group G of
order N and given two group elements ga ∈ G and gb ∈ G
where a,b ∈ ZN are two secrets, the problem of calculating
gab from ga and gb is called the Computational Diffie Hellman
problem.
Definition 7. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assump-
tion (DBDH)
CTA AA O CSPU STCS
PP
Run setup(λ)
=PP
Run encrypt(PP,
pkAAj,M,ψ)=(CT,V)
Run setupauth(PP)
= (pkAAj,skAAj)
pkAAj
(CT,V)
Run keygen(PP,skAAj,
pkAAj,GID,Sj,GID)=
(pkAAj,skAAj)
skj,GID
Request Secret 
Key(GID,Sj,GID) 
Request Data File 
Return (CT,V)
Run transform(PP,
skj,GID, ψ,CT)
= (tkj,GID)
(CT, ψ,tpkj,GID)
Return (M’)
Run decryptout(tpkj,GID,ψ,CT)
= M’
Run decrypt(M’,
tskj,GID)=M
Fig. 2. General Overview of PHAOBE
Given a generator g of a multiplicative cyclic group G of
order N and given three group elements ga ∈ G, gb ∈ G and
gc ∈Gwhere a,b,c∈Z∗N are three secrets, the problem of dis-
tinguishing between tuples of the form (ga,gb,gc, eˆ(g,g)abc)
and (ga,gb,gc, eˆ(g,g)z) for some random integer z, is called
the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DBDH).
5.3. Concrete Construction
Our PHOABE construction is based on seven algorithms de-
fined as follows:
• setup – the CTA defines two multiplicative groups G1
and GT of order P, a symmetric bilinear map eˆ : G1 ×
G1 → GT , g a generator of G1 and four collusion re-
sistant hash functions H ′ : {0,1}∗ → ZP,H0 : {M } →
{0,1}nH0 ,H1 : {M } → {0,1}∗,H2 : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}nH2 ,
where M is the message universe. Finally, it outputs the
global public parameters PP defined as follows:
PP= {G1,GT ,P,H ′,H0,H1,H2, eˆ,g}
• setupauth – recall that each attribute authority AA j,
where j ∈ {1, · · · ,N}) and N is the number of attribute
authorities, manages a set of attributes SAA j . Each at-
tribute authority chooses two random numbers αi, ti ∈ Z∗N
for each attribute i ∈ SAA j and a number y j ∈ Z∗N . Then, it
generates the pair of private and public keys (skAA j , pkAA j)
defined as follows:
skAA j = ({αi, ti}i∈SAA j ,y j)
pkAA j = ({eˆ(g,g)αi ,gti}i∈SAA j ,g
y j)
• encrypt – this randomized algorithm is based on the fol-
lowing three steps:
(i) First, the data owner O selects a random value a ∈ Z∗N
and computes qi = eˆ((gy j)a,H ′(xi)), where {xi}i∈F de-
notes one attribute of the access policy Ψ and F is the
number of attributes in Ψ. In order to ensure the access
policy privacy preservation feature, the data owner re-
places each attribute xi specified in the access structure
Ψ, by the computed value q f . Then, the access policy Ψ
is converted to LSSS access matrix (An×l ,ρ).
(ii) Afterwards, the data owner O picks a random values
s ∈ ZN . In addition, O selects pi ∈ Z∗N for each row Ai
of A. O chooses a random message R ∈ GT . Then, the
encrypt algorithm computes λi and wi such that λi =
~Ai ·~v, where ~v = [s,v1, · · · ,vl ] ∈ ZN l is a random vec-
tor and wi = ~Ai ·~τ such that ~τ = [0,τ1, · · · ,τl ] ∈ ZN l is
a random vector. The encrypt algorithm outputs the
ciphertext as a tuple CTABE = (h,C0,C1,i,C2,i,C3,i)i∈[1,n],
where i presents a matrix row corresponding to an at-
tribute i, defined as follows:
h = ga
C0 = R · eˆ(g,g)s
C1,i = g
λρ(i)gαρ(i)pi
C2,i = gpi
C3,i = gtρi pigwi
(iii) Finally, the algorithm sets R0 = H0(R) and com-
putes a symmetric key Ksym = H1(R). Subsequently,
it computes the encryption of the message M using a
symmetric encryption algorithm Encryptsym such as
CTsym = encryptsym(Ksym,M) and the verification key
V =H2(R0||CTsym).
The encrypt algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT =
{CTABE ,CTsym} as well as the verification key V .
• keygen – for any user U having a set of attributes S j,GID =
{a1 j , · · · ,an j} related to an attribute authority AA j, this
latter computes the secret key sk j,GID as follows:
sk j,GID =({K1,i,K2,i}i∈S j,GID)= {gαiH ′(GID)ti ,H ′(i)y j}i∈S j,GID
• tranform – this randomized algorithm, executed by the
decrypting entity, relies on the two following steps:
(i) First, in order to reconstruct the access policy, the user
computes the following equation:
q′i = eˆ(h,H ′(i)yi) = eˆ(ga,H ′(i)y j)∀i ∈ S j,GID
Then, using q′i to replace the attribute i, an attribute set
S′GID is constructed. The user can identifies the set of
attributes L′ = {i : (ρ(i)∩S′GID)i∈[n]} required for the de-
cryption.
(ii) Second, the user chooses a random value z ∈ Z∗N and
sets the transformation keys {tk j,GID} j∈N =({t pk j,GID} j∈N ,
tskGID), where {t pk j,GID} j∈N and tskGID are computed as
follows: {t pk j,GID} j∈N = ({K
1/z
1,i }i∈L′ ,g1/z,H(GID)1/z)
tskGID = z
Finally, the user outsources the ciphertext CT and the set
of the transformation public keys {t pk j,GID} j∈N to the
STCS.
• decryptout – to partially decrypt the ciphertext CT , the
STCS proceeds as follows. First, for each matrix row cor-
responding to an attribute i, the STCS computes:
r = eˆ(g
1/z,C1,i).eˆ(H ′(GID)1/z,C3,i)
eˆ(gαi/zH ′(GID)ti/z,C2,i)
= (eˆ(g,g)λi eˆ(H ′(GID),g)wi)1/z
Afterwards, the STCS chooses a set of constants
{ci}i∈[1,n] ∈ ZN such that ∑i ci~Ai = [1,0, · · · ,0]. Then, it
computes the ∏ni=1rci , such as:
n
∏
i=1
rci = (
n
∏
i=1
(eˆ(g,g)λi eˆ(g,g)wit j)1/z
= (eˆ(g,g)∑
n
i=1 λici eˆ(g,g)∑
κ
j=1 t j∑
n
i=1 wici)
ci
z
We note that λi = ~A.~v and wi = ~A.~τ, where~v.[1,0, · · · ,0]
= ∑ni=1λici = s and ~w.[1,0, · · · ,0] = ∑ni=1 wici = 0.
In the sequel, the STCS gets the following result:
M′ =
n
∏
i=1
rci = eˆ(g,g) sz (1)
Finally, the STCS returns M′ to the user.
• decrypt– the decrypt algorithm includes the following
two steps:
(i) First, based on the partially decrypted ciphertext M′,
the user executes Equation 2 while performing only one
exponentiation without calculating any pairing functions
to recover the message.
R =
C0
(R′)tsk
=
C0
(eˆ(g,g)
s
z )z
=
C0
eˆ(g,g)s
(2)
(ii) Then, the user computes R0 = H0(R). If, the algo-
rithm checks H2(R0||CTsym) 6= V , then it returns ⊥ and
halts immediately.
Otherwise, it computes Ksym = H1(R). Then, it returns
the message M = Decryptsym(Ksym,CTsym).
The proof of correctness of the decryption algorithm is
detailed in Section 6.1.
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first prove the correctness of our PHOABE
construction, with respect to the data decryption algorithms,
in section 6.1. Then, we prove the security of our proposal,
with respect to the indistinguishability, verifiabity and privacy
preserving properties, in Section 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 respectively.
6.1. Correctness
The correctness of our PHOABE construction is detailed by
the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Data Decryption Correctness.
Proof. (i) After receiving the set of the user’s transforma-
tion keys related to the involved attributes {t pk j,GID} j∈N , the
STCS first computes:
r = eˆ(g
1/z,gλρ(i)gαρ(i)pi).eˆ(H ′(GID)1/z,gtρi pigwi)
eˆ(gαi/zH ′(GID)ti/z,gpi)
=
eˆ(g,g)
λρ(i)
z eˆ(g,g)
αρ(i) pi
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
tρi pi
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
wi
z
eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
αρ(i) pi
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
tρ(i) pi
z
= eˆ(g,g)
λρ(i)
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
wi
z
Then, STCS calculates the constants ci ∈ ZN such that
∑i ci ·~Ai = [1,0, · · · ,0].
Note that λρ(i) = ~Aρ(i) ·~v, where ~v = [s,v2, · · · ,vn] and
wi = ~Ai ·~τ such as~τ = [0,τ2, · · · ,τn]. Hence, we deduce that
∑ni=1λρ(i)ci = s and ∑i wici = 0.
Consequently, the partially decrypted ciphertext M′ =
eˆ(g,g)
s
z is derived as follows:
n
∏
i=1
rci =
n
∏
i=1
eˆ(g,g)ci
λρ(i)
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
ci wiz
= eˆ(g,g)
∑κj=1 ciλρ(i)
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
ci
∑κj=1 wi
z
= eˆ(g,g)
∑κj=1 ciλρ(i)
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)
∑κj=1 wici
z
= eˆ(g,g)
s
z eˆ(H ′(GID),g)0
= eˆ(g,g)
s
z
(ii) In the sequel, the user uses the partially decrypted ci-
phertext M′ and the secret transformation key tsk to compute
R as follows:
R =
C0
(R′)tsk
=
C0
(eˆ(g,g)
s
z )z
=
C0
eˆ(g,g)s
(3)
(iii) Then, in order to verify the correctness of the out-
sourced decryption, the user computes R0 =H0(R).
Then, if he checks H2(R0||CTsym) 6= V ,then it returns ⊥
and halts immediately.
If the decryption is verified, then the user computes the
original message as follows:
Ksym =H1(R)
.
As such, he retrieves the message as:
M = Decryptsym(Ksym,CTsym)
6.2. Indistinguishability
In the following proof, we prove that our scheme is RCPA-
Secure against static corruption of the attribute authorities
with respect to Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. If Lewko et al. decentralized CP-ABE scheme
[29] is CPA-secure, then, our PHOABE scheme is selectively
RCPA-secure such that AdvA [Expcon f ] ≤ AdvA [ExpLewko],
according to Definition 3.
Proof. We define a PPT algorithm adversary A running the
Expcon f security game defined in Section 4.2.1 with an en-
tity B . This entity B is also running the Lewko et al’s CPA-
security game (Lewko-Game) with a challenger C . The ob-
jective of the proof is to show that the advantage of the adver-
sary A to win the Expcon f game is smaller than the advantage
of the entity B to win Lewko-Game. Hereafter A , B and C
interactions are described, with A running the following steps
and algorithms, as specified in the Expcon f game:
Initialisation – in this phase, the adversary A gives the
algorithm B a challenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Setup – B runs the setup to generate the public pa-
rameters. For instance, it sets two multiplicative groups G1
and GT of order P, a bilinear map eˆ : G1×G1 → GT , g a
generator of G1 and four collusion resistant hash functions
H ′∗,H ∗0,H ∗1,H ∗2 : {0,1}∗ → ZP. Finally, it outputs the
public parameters PP defined as PP= {G1,GT ,P,H ′∗,H ∗0,H ∗1
,H ∗2, eˆ,g}. In addition, B calls the challenger C to execute
the setupauth algorithm to generate the attribute authorities
public keys. Then, C chooses two random numbers αi, ti ∈Z∗N
for each attribute i ∈ SAA j and a number y j ∈ Z∗N . Then, it
generates the attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j} de-
fined as pkAA j = ({eˆ(g,g)αi ,gti}i∈SAA j ,gy j). Finally, C sends
to B the attribute authorities public keys {pkAA j} which is
sent next by B to A .
Queries phase 1 – B first initializes an empty table T and
an empty set D. Then, for each session k, the adversary issues
the following queries:
Private Key query: when the adversary issues a key query
by submitting a set of attributes SGID and his identity GID.
Then, the algorithm B uses the challenger C to generate
and return the corresponding secret keys to the adversary
{K1,i}i∈S j,GID) = {gαiH ′(GID)ti}i∈S j,GID . Afterwards, the
challenger C chooses y j ∈ Z∗N and sets {sk j,GID} j∈N =
({K1,i,K2,i}i∈S j,GID) = {gαiH ′(GID)ti ,H ′(i)y j)}i∈S j,GID . The
secret keys {sk j,GID} j∈N) are returned to the adversary A .
Then, B sets D = D∪ {SGID}k and returns the secret keys
{sk j,GID} j∈N to the adversary A .
Transformation Key query: B searches the entry (SGID,skSGID, j ,
tkGID, j) in table T . If such entry exists, it returns the transfor-
mation key tkGID, j to the adversary A .
Otherwise, it generates a random value a and sets the
value h = ga to simulate the output of the encrypt al-
gorithm used to run the tranform. h is, then, sent to
the challenger C . Then, the challenger chooses a ran-
dom exponent z ∈ Z∗N and sets the transformation key such
as {t pk j,GID} j∈N = ({K1/z1,i }i∈L′ ,g1/z,H(GID)1/z). Then,
B stores in the table T the entry (SGID,skGID, j, tkGID, j).
Then, it returns to the adversary the transformation key
{tk j,GID} j∈N = ({t pk j,GID} j∈N , tskGID).
Challenge – the adversary A sends two different equal
length messages {R0,R1} ∈ GT to the algorithm B who for-
wards them to the challenger C . This latter chooses a bit
b ∈ {0,1} and sends Rb to the challenger C . Afterwards,
C chooses a bit b ∈ {0,1} and encrypts Rb under the chal-
lenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) using Lewko and Waters
scheme and returns CTb,ABE to B .
Afterwards, with the probability equal to the advantage
of the adversary in Lewko-game (AdvA [ExpLewko]), B tries to
guess b. Then, this latter sets R∗0,b = H0(R∗b) and computes
a symmetric key K∗sym = H1(R∗b) . Consequently, B encrypts
R∗b using encryptsym(K
∗
sym,R
∗
b) to generate CT
∗
b,sym. In addi-
tion, B sets the verification key V ∗ = H2(R∗0,b||CT ∗b,sym). Af-
terwards, the algorithm B sends CT ∗b = (CT ∗b,ABE ,CT ∗b,sym) to
the adversary as a challenge ciphertext as well as the verifica-
tion key V ∗.
Queries phase 2 – A continues to query a polynomially
bounded number of queries and B answers as in Queries
Phase 1, except that the adversary A can not query secret
keys related to a set of attributes which satisfy the access pol-
icy Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗).
Guess – the adversaryA outputs a bit b′. Then, B sends b′
to C as its guess about b. If b′= b, C answers 1 as the solution
to the given instance of the DBDH problem with respect to
Definition 7 as introduced in Lewko et al. security analysis
[29].
The adversary A outputs a bit b′. The probability to break
the instance of Expcon f game is smaller than the Lewko-
Game, as it is necessary for B to win the game for A to be
able to get the right CT ∗b values, and try to guess the value
of b. As such Pr[ExpA
Lewko(1ξ)] ≥ Pr[ExpA con f−real(1ξ)],
and the advantage of adversary A is negligible. Then our
PHOABE scheme satisfies the confidentiality property.
6.3. Verifiability
In this section, we prove that our scheme is verifiable against
malicious servers with respect to Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If H2 and H0 are two collision-resistant hash
functions, then, our PHOABE scheme is verifiable against
malicious servers.
Proof. We define a PPT algorithm B which aims to break the
verifiability property of the outsourcing ABE system under
the help of the adversary A . B simulates the adversary views
with respect to the Expveri f security game defined in Section
4.2.1. To do so, B tries to break the collision resistance of the
H2 or theH0 hash functions . Given two challenge hash func-
tions (H ∗2 , H ∗0 ), B simulates the security game introduced in
Definition 4 as follows:
First, B runs the setup algorithms to generate the public
parameters except the hash functions H2 or H0. In addition,
B generates the attribute authorities public and secret keys
by running the setupauth algorithm. Afterwards, B runs the
adversary queries Queries phase 1 and Queries phase 2 in
order to get secret keys and the transformation keys related to
a set of attributes.
In the challenge phase, the adversary A sends a challenge
message M∗ to the algorithm B . Then, this latter picks a
random message R∗ ∈ GT and encrypts R∗ under the chal-
lenge access structure Ψ∗ = (A∗,ρ∗) using Lewko and Waters
scheme. Then, B sets R∗0 =H ∗0 (R∗) and computes a symmet-
ric key K∗sym = H ∗1 (R∗). Subsequently, it computes the en-
cryption of the message M∗ using a symmetric encryption al-
gorithm Encryptsym such as CT ∗sym = encryptsym(K∗sym,M∗).
In addition, C sets the verification key V ∗ = H ∗2 (R∗0||CT ∗sym).
Afterwards, the algorithm B sends CT ∗ = (CT ∗ABE ,CT ∗sym) =
(h,C0,C1,i,C2,i,C3,i,CT ∗sym) to the adversary as a challenge ci-
phertext as well as the verification key V ∗.
If A breaks the verifiability game, B will recover a mes-
sage M /∈ {M∗,⊥} relying on the partially decryption algo-
rithm decryptout(PP,{t pk j,GID} j∈N ,(A∗,ρ∗),CT ∗).
Notice that the decryption algorithm outputs ⊥ if
H ∗2 (R∗0||CT ∗sym) 6=V ∗ where R∗0 =H ∗0 (R∗) and
R∗ = decryptsym(K∗sym,CT ∗sym). As a consequence, the fol-
lowing two cases are considered:
• Case 1: Since B knows (R∗0,CT ∗sym), if (R0,CTsym) 6=
(R∗0,CT
∗
sym) is returned as a result, then B obtains a colli-
sion of the hash function H ∗2 .
• Case 2: If we get (R0,CTsym) = (R∗0,CT ∗sym), while R∗ and
R are not equal (R∗ 6= R). Then, B breaks the collision re-
sistance condition ofH ∗0 asH ∗0 (R) = R0 = R∗0 =H ∗0 (R∗).
Consequently, using an absurdum reasoning, since the
hash functions H2 and H0 are two collision resistant func-
tions, then our scheme PHOABE is verifiable.
6.4. Policy Privacy Preservation
In this section, we prove that our scheme is privacy-preserving
against both malicious users and servers with respect to The-
orem 3.
Theorem 3. Our PHOABE scheme is policy privacy preserv-
ing according to Definition 5.
Sketch of proof. In PHOABE scheme, the encrypting en-
tity encrypts data under an access policy Ψ. Afterwards, he
generates a new value equal to eˆ((gy j)a,H ′(xi)) based on the
one-way anonymous key agreement protocol [60] where a is
a random number. This generated value is used to obfuscate
the attribute xi. For instance, in order to ensure the access
policy privacy preservation feature, the encrypting entity re-
places each attribute xi specified in the access policy Ψ, by
the generated value eˆ((gy j)a,H ′(xi)).
In order to recover the access policy, the decrypting
entity uses his corresponding private key {K2,i}i∈S j,GID =
{H ′(i)y j)}i∈S j,GID to compute the value q′i = eˆ(h,H ′(i)yi) =
eˆ(ga,H ′(i)yi)∀i ∈ SGID. Hence, only authorized users hav-
ing the right secret keys can recover the access policy. For
instance, thanks to the random value a, unauthorized users
cannot guess xi from the obfuscated value eˆ((gy j)a,H ′(xi))
Consequently, the policy privacy preservation require-
ment is ensured thanks to the security of the one-way anony-
mous key agreement protocol [60]. In addition, users cannot
reveal the embedded attribute in the access policy when
they collude, because they cannot infer the attribute xi from
eˆ(ga,H ′(i)yi).
7. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the computation and storage com-
plexities of our PHOABE scheme. For this purpose, we are
interested by the computations performed at the data owner
side in order to execute the encrypt algorithm. In addition,
we consider the computation cost related to the execution of
decrypt and decryptout algorithms performed by the user
(U) and the Semi Trusted Cloud Server (STCS), respectively.
Moreover, we introduce the size of the user’s secret keys as
well as the ciphertext’s size.
For this purpose, we denote by:
• E1 : exponentiation in G1
• ET : exponentiation in GT
• τP : computation of a pairing function eˆ
• n is number of attributes used in the access policy
• |S| is the number of attributes in the set of attributes re-
lated to a user
Table 3 details the performance comparison with the most
closely related ABE schemes.
7.1. Computation Complexities
In [26], Nishide et al. proposed a hidden policy ABE scheme
requiring one exponentiation in GT and (2n+ 1) exponenti-
ations in G1 in the encryption process. For the decryption
phase, the user needs to compute (2n+ 1) pairing functions.
In 2011, Green et al. [24] proposed the first ABE scheme with
outsourced decryption. This proposal consists in using a semi
trusted server to compute (2n+ 1) pairing functions and 2n
exponentiation inGT in order to generate a partially decrypted
ciphertext. Afterwards, the user needs only one exponentia-
tion in GT to retrieve the original message. In the encryp-
tion process, the data owner needs (4+ 3n) exponentiations
in G1 and one exponentiation in GT . Lai et al. [50] intro-
duced an outsourced ABE scheme consisting in verifying the
correctness of the ciphertext. In this scheme, the encryption
algorithm requires 2 exponentiations in GT and the decryp-
tion algorithm performs 6n exponentiations in G1. Beyond
the encryption and decryption costs, this scheme consists in
computing 2 hash functions, in both the encryption and de-
cryption processes, in order to use them in the verification
process. Similarly, Qin et al. [45] and Lin et al. [54] pro-
posed two verifiable outsourced ABE schemes. In the [45]
proposal, the encryption and decryption algorithms overheads
are equal to τp +E1(4+ 3n) and 2nET + τp(2n+ 1), respec-
tively. To verify the ciphertext’s correctness, 3 hash func-
tions have to be performed at both the data owner and user
sides. In the [54] construction, the data owner needs to com-
pute (3+ 2n) exponentiations in G1, one exponentiation in
GT and 2 hash functions. Moreover, the user computes one
exponentiation in GT and 2 hash functions to decrypt and ver-
ify the ciphertext. In addition, the semi trusted server com-
putes 2n exponentiations in GT and (2n+ 1) pairing func-
tions. In the outsourced attribute based encryption scheme
proposed by Li et al. [51], the user needs to compute only
one exponentiation in GT while outsourcing (2n+2) pairing
functions and (2n+ 2) exponentiations in GT . The encryp-
tion algorithm performs (3+ 2n) exponentiations in G1. In
2015, Zhou et al. [57] introduced a policy hiding broadcast
ABE scheme where the encryption and decryption overheads
are independent from the number of attributes involved in the
access structure. Afterwards, Xu et al. [28] proposed a pol-
icy privacy preserving ABE scheme. The processing costs are
equal to E1(n+2) and τp(n+1)+nET for the encryption and
decryption phases, respectively. In 2016, Zhong et al. [58]
proposed the first multi-attribute authority ABE scheme with
hidden access policy. This proposal consists in performing
2 pairing functions, 3n exponentiations in G1 and (1+ 2n)
exponentiations in GT in the encryption phase. Moreover, the
decryption algorithm computes (1+2n) pairing functions and
n exponentiations in GT . Zho et al. [25] proposed an out-
sourced ABE scheme for fog computing applications. This
scheme consists in computing (N+1) exponentiations in G1,
4 exponentiations in GT , where N is the cardinal of the at-
tribute universe, and 2 hash functions to decrypt the message.
The semi trusted server partially decrypts the message by per-
forming (4+2N+n) pairing functions, N exponentiations in
GT and 2 hash functions. Finally, the user has to perform only
4 exponentiations in GT and 2 hash functions to decrypt data.
Recently, Li et al. [55] proposed a verifiable outsourced ABE
scheme with constant ciphertext size. In this proposal, to en-
crypt data, the data owner performs 6 exponentiations in G1,
2 exponentiations in GT and one hash function. In addition,
the semi trusted server computes 4 pairing functions and the
user performs one exponentiation in GT and 2 hash functions.
In our PHOABE scheme, the data owner performs 5 ex-
ponentiations in G1, one exponentiation in GT and 3 hash
functions. In addition, our proposal consists in using a semi
trusted cloud server to compute the expensive computation
operations such as performing 3n pairing functions and one
exponentiation in GT . As a consequence, the user only com-
putes one exponentiation in GT and 3 hash functions to exe-
cute the verification process.
Above all, the processing costs of our PHOABE scheme
remain competitive compared to other encryption schemes.
Indeed, our construction consists in outsourcing the computa-
tion of expensive operations.
Table 3. Computation and Storage Costs’ Comparison of Attribute Based Encryption Schemes
Scheme outourced decryption Key Size Transform Key Size Ciphertext Size Encryption Cost User Decryption Cost STCS Decryption Cost
[26] 7 1+ |S| – 2+2n ET +E1(2n+1) τp(2n+1) –
[24] X 2+ |S| 3+ |S| 4+2n ET +E1(4+3n) ET 2nET + τp(2n+1)
[50] X 2+ |S| 3+ |S| 5+4n ET +2E1+2O(H ) 2ET +4E1+6nE1+2O(H ) τp(2+4n)+4nET
[51] X 2|S| 2|S|+1 4+n E1(3+2n) τp(2n+2)+ET (2+2n) ET
[57] 7 1+ |2S| – 4 3E1 4τp –
[28] 7 1+ |S| – 2+n E1(n+2) τp(n+1)+nET –
[45] X 3+ |S| 4+ |S| 4+2n ET + τp+E1(4+3n)3O(H ) ET +3O(H ) 2nET + τp(2n+1)
[54] X 2+ |S| 3+ |S| 4+n E1(1+4n)+ET +2O(H ) ET +2O(H ) 2nET + τp(2n+1)
[58] 7 2|S| – 3+3n 2τp+ET (1+2n)+3nE1 τp(1+2n)+nET –
[27] 7 6 – 5 8E1 6τp+4nE1 –
[25] X N+ |S|+1 N+2 5+N ET +E1(N+1)+2O(H ) 4ET +4O(H ) τp(4+2N+n)+NET +O(H )
[55] X 2 3 8 6E1+2ET +O(H ) 4τp ET +2O(H )
PHOABE X 2|S| 2|S|+3 4+3n 5E1+ET +3O(H ) ET +3O(H ) 3nτp+ET
7.2. Storage Complexities
The policy hidden attribute based encryption schemes [26,28]
have the same size of user’s secret keys which is equal to
1+ |S|, where S represents the set of attributes of the user.
Differently, the proposals introduced in [57, 58] have almost
the same size of user’s secret keys which is equal to |2S|. The
attribute based encryption schemes with outsourced decryp-
tion, presented in [24, 45, 50, 54] consist in using user’s se-
crets keys and transformation keys. Consequently, the total
size of user’s keys is equal to double the size of his set of
attributes. The ABE schemes [27, 55] have constant size of
user’s secret keys. However, since Li et al. [55] proposal is
an ABE scheme with outsourced decryption, the user’s secret
keys involve the transformation keys whose size is equal to 8.
The size of the user’s keys in the Zuo’s et al. proposal [25]
are equal to N + |S|+ 1 and N + 2 for the user’s secret keys
and the transformation keys, respectively. Note that N is the
cardinal of the attribute universe.
In both Li et al. [51] and PHOABE proposals, the size
of the user’s secret keys is equal to 2|S| while the size of the
transformation keys is equal to 2|S|+3.
The ABE schemes [27, 55, 57] present a ciphertext with
a constant size which does not depend on the number of
attributes used in the access policy. In the existing ABE
schemes such as [24, 26, 45], the authors introduce ABE
schemes where the size of the generated ciphertext is approx-
imately equal to 2n. Recall that n is the number of attributes
involved in the access policy. In [28], Xu et al. introduce
a hidden policy ABE scheme with a ciphertext’s size equal
to 2+ n. In 2016, Zuo et al. proposed an outsourced ABE
scheme for fog computing applications where the ciphertext’s
size depends on the cardinal of the set of attributes. The ci-
phertext size of the ABE schemes with outsourced decryption
proposed by Li et al. and Lin et al. in [51, 54] is proportional
to 4+n. The ABE technique with outsourced decryption pro-
posed by Lai et al. presents a ciphertext’s size equal to 5+4n.
The multi-authority ABE scheme proposed by Zhong et al.
in [58] introduces a ciphertext’s size equivalent to 3 times the
cardinal of the access policy. Similarly, our PHOABE con-
struction produces a ciphertext which is 3 times the cardinal
of the access structure.
Taking into consideration that PHOABE is a multi-
authority scheme, we state that our construction presents
interesting performances especially related to the key size
and the size of the ciphertext.
7.3. Resource-Constrained Performance Analysis
Several research works have been proposed to evaluate the
computation overhead of attribute based encryption schemes
on resource-constrained devices [61–65]. These papers in-
troduced experimental performance analysis of the different
ABE algorithms on mobile devices and sensors.
Ometov et al. [64] evaluate the impact of elementary
cryptographic operations on different resource-constrained
devices as detailed in Table 4. As our PHOABE framework
relies on the use of bilinear maps as well as mathematical op-
erations in a multiplicative group, we investigate the impacts
of these operations (Figures 3, 4, and 5) on the performance of
different IoT devices, based on the results introduced in [64].
Figure 5 shows the computation cost of one pairing opera-
tion in different IoT devices (cf., Table 4). The most efficient
device here is Intel Edison with JDK 1.8.0 that computes a
single pairing operation in around 500 ms.
As the pairing operations are extremely expensive, at-
tribute based encryption can not be applied to secure IoT
devices. Thus, the only solution to benefit from the security
feature of ABE is to apply it using outsourced decryption
feature.
In ciphertext attribute based encryption, the size of an en-
crypted file mainly depends on the number of attributes in-
volved in the access policy used in the encryption phase [39].
To estimate the real-world computation costs on a client
side, we investigate the computation overhead of PHOABE
on a Samsung I9500 Galaxy S4. As shown in Figure 6, the
computation costs at the user side increase with the number
of attributes used in the encryption.
However, while applying outsourced decryption, the user
computation costs are independent of the number of attributes
as the user only needs to compute one exponentiation and one
Table 4. Selected Devices [64]
Device Type Processor
Sony SmartWatch 3 SWR50 Smart Watch 520 MHz Single-core Cortex-A7
Samsung I9500 Galaxy S4 Smartphone 1.6 GHz Dual-Core Cortex-A15
Jiayu S3 Advanced Smartphone 1.7 GHz Octa-Core 64bit Cortex A53
Intel Edison IoT Development Board 500 MHz Dual-Core Intel AtomTM CPU, 100 Mhz MCU
Raspberry Pi 1 model B IoT Development Board 700 MHz Single-Core ARM Cortex-A6
Raspberry Pi 2 model B IoT Development Board 900 MHz Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A7
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multiplication (c.f, Table 5).
Table 5. Number of Cryptographic Operations computed by
STCS and User in PHOABE.
Exp Mul Pairing
STCS 1 2 3n
USer 1 1 0
8. CONCLUSION
The number of devices connecting to the Internet of Things
(IoT) is growing exponentially, as does the amount of data
produced. As such, cloud assisted IoT services is emerging
as a promising solution to deal with the computation and stor-
age of the huge amounts of produced data and to delegate the
expensive operations to cloud servers. The widespread use of
these services requires customized security and privacy levels
to be guaranteed.
In this paper, we present PHOABE, a novel privacy-
preserving outsourcing multi-authority attribute based en-
cryption scheme, that permits to overcomes the computa-
tional costs of decryption that scale with the complexity of
the access policy and the number of attributes. The pro-
posed technique can be considered as an optimization of the
decryption algorithm to mitigate the practical issues in im-
plementing CP-ABE on resource-constrained devices. For
instance, PHOABE is a multi-attribute authority mechanism
which ensures delegating the expensive computations for
ABE decryption to a Semi Trusted Cloud Server and pro-
tecting user’s privacy using a hidden access policy. Finally,
PHOABE is proven to be selectively secure, verifiable and
policy privacy preserving under the random oracle model.
As for future work, we plan to further improve PHOABE
by exploring direct revocation solution to achieve more se-
curity features. For instance, a compromised user should be
revoked without affecting other users.
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